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TORTURE AS A VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS
Louis B. Sohn*
A provision of United States law, which Judge Friendly once
called a "legal Lohengrin,"' has formed the basis of a recent deci-
sion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Constituting an important milestone in international enforcement
of basic human rights, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala2 declared that
United States federal courts have jurisdiction in an action for
damages by an alien against another alien, if the act complained of
constituted a violation of the law of nations. The court applied the
jurisdictional clause in 28 U.S.C. §1350, derived from the Judiciary
Act of 1789, that federal district courts "shall have jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The Filartiga
court held that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of of-
ficial authority violates universally accepted norms of the interna-
tional law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the par-
ties. Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with
process by an alien within our borders, section 1350 provides
federal jurisdiction."3
In finding that "an act of torture committed by a state official
against one held in detention violates established norms of the in-
ternational law of human rights, and hence the law of nations," the
court took an expansive view of international law. Following The
Paquete Habana,4 the court made clear that "courts must inter-
pret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved
and exists among the nations of the world today." While
acknowledging that "the general assent of civilized nations" is
necessary to establish "a settled rule of international law,"5 the
court considered that this stringent requirement was met in the
case at bar, as "there are few, if any, issues in international law
today on which opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on
a state's power to torture persons held in its custody."
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These requirements were also taken from The Paquete Habana.
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The court relied on the provisions in the Charter of the United
Nations by which all Member Nations pledged themselves to take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the United Nations
to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion."I The court considered that these
provisions made it clear that "in this modern age a state's treat-
ment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern," and
disagreed in this respect with the lower court, which held that the
concept of "the law of nations" employed in section 1350 did not
extend to a state's treatment of its own citizens.7 Neither was the
court sympathetic to the contention that the Charter was not a
self-executing treaty. It was satisfied that the Charter can be used
as "evidence of binding principles of international law." In par-
ticular, the court relied on several United Nations declarations,
adopted without dissent, which made clear, inter alia, that "no one
shall be subjected to torture," and that a victim of torture "shall be
afforded redress and compensation." The court pointed out that
these declarations specified with great precision the obligations of
Member Nations under the Charter and had become a part of
binding, customary international law. Other international treaties
(to which the United States is not a party) confirmed the universal
renunciation of torture in the modern usage and practice of na-
tions; similarly, the laws of many countries prohibit torture, ex-
pressly or implicitly. Finally, the court relied on the practice of na-
tions, especially on the fact that in modern times "no government
has asserted the right to torture its own nationals," and that
governments accused of torture either have denied its occurrence,
or have asserted that "the conduct was unauthorized or con-
stituted rough treatment short of torture."8
While there were several other issues raised in this case, both
with respect to jurisdiction and the applicable law, the importance
of the case lies in its clear recognition that international law has
been transformed by developments after the Second World
War, and that certain violations of that law with respect to in-
U.N. CHARTER, arts. 55 & 56.
The court also held that the dictum in Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, at 31 (1976), to
the effect that "violations of international law do not occur when the aggrieved parties are
nationals of the acting state," is clearly out of tune with the current usage and practice of
international law. The court also referred to recent United States statutes refusing
assistance to governments engaged in "a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights." See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (2).
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dividuals, even when they are nationals of the acting state, are no
longer matters of domestic jurisdiction. The practice of the inter-
national community, manifested by general and special inter-
national agreements, declarations of international institutions
adopted without dissenting votes, or concurrent bilateral as well
as unilateral acts, has led to acceptance of new rules of inter-
national law, for the violation of which an individual can be held
responsible. In the past, issues of responsibility of states have
been considered primarily on the international plane, through the
diplomatic channel or before international tribunals; but this deci-
sion makes possible direct enforcement against the individual
responsible for the violation of international law, at least in a few
cases where a particular violation of human rights is clearly
recognized as a violation of a generally binding rule of customary
international law. It is not likely that this provision will be applied
in many cases, but there may be an occasion, as in this case, where
the violator can be found and served with process within the
borders of a country willing to provide a remedy for the violation.
Thus, in cases of universal crimes, such as piracy, slavery, or-in
this case-torture, either criminal prosecution, or at least a tort
remedy, will be available. In such a situation, international law
recognizes that a state can exercise jurisdiction over the violator
of a rule of international law, and that his national state cannot
contend that such an exercise of jurisdiction is itself a violation of
international law. What acts will be subject to such jurisdiction
will, of course, depend on the development of international law.
According to the court, as a result of recent developments, an
act of torture committed by a state official against one held in
detention constitutes a violation of the international law of human
rights, and hence the law of nations. In this respect, the view of
the court coincides with that of the executive, as stated in the
amicus curiae brief filed in this case on behalf of the United
States. Together, they constitute an important addition to inter-
national practice in the field of human rights, which - it may be
hoped -other countries may be willing to follow.
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